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Poland: Jaruzelski and the Party on the Eve of Its 10th Congress [redacted] 25X1

An Intelligence Assessment

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EUR 86-10018
June 1986

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Poland: Jaruzelski and the Party on the Eve of Its 10th Congress

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An Intelligence Assessment

This paper was prepared by
Office of European Analysis, with a
contribution from Office of
Leadership Analysis. It was coordinated with the
Directorate of Operations.

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Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, East European Division, EURA,

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Key Judgments

Information available as of 9 June 1986 was used in this report.

After almost five years as First Secretary of the Polish United Workers' Party (PZPR), Gen. Wojciech Jaruzelski has had only limited success in giving the party a new sense of vigor and molding it into a reliable and effective instrument under his control. As we look to the party's 10th Congress in late June and to events over the next year, we conclude that Jaruzelski is unlikely to make the kind of conciliatory gesture, whether in human rights, in seeking a genuine dialogue with the Roman Catholic Church, or on such matters as trade union pluralism, which could lead to better relations with the United States. He may even calculate that maintaining a tough posture toward the United States gives him an advantage in coping with hardline elements in the Polish party and in his relationship with Moscow. He realizes that Poland needs help from the West, but prefers to seek that assistance in Western Europe.

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Despite Jaruzelski's problems as party chief, he will probably win reelection at the congress opening on 29 June. He is in complete command of the top party leadership bodies—the Politburo and the Secretariat—and the congress probably will increase the number of his supporters in the Central Committee. He appears determined, in our judgment, to use the congress as part of a campaign to change his image from that of a military leader called upon in the short term to crush Solidarity to a more traditional political leader with considerable staying power. We believe he wants to lead Poland through its political and economic reconstruction and not be seen solely as the man who imposed martial law.

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We believe Jaruzelski will encounter some scattered criticism at the congress and continued resistance from middle-level leaders in the provinces. Nevertheless, Jaruzelski should emerge from the congress in a stronger position to purge such uncooperative elements at regional and local party elections later this year. But, even if he is reasonably successful, he would need a decade or more to build the kind of responsive, disciplined bureaucracy necessary to correct the country's massive economic and political problems.

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Jaruzelski's political position has been enhanced this year by strong Soviet backing. Polish-Soviet relations are the best they have been in a decade

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The Soviets signaled their support for Jaruzelski at their party congress in March by

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giving him preferential protocol treatment and allowing a politically sensitive visit to a former Polish possession in a Soviet Baltic republic. We believe the Soviets are pleased with Jaruzelski's success in restoring and maintaining civil order, but they would like him to be tougher toward the church, less dependent on his military colleagues, and less dependent on Soviet economic assistance.

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Much of the rhetoric at the congress will insist that Poland is currently moving from a troubled past to a promising future. In our view, the vast majority of the Polish populace will not believe the message and will remain hostile, if apathetic, toward the regime because of the sense of independence nurtured by a powerful church and the recent experiences of the Solidarity era when Polish workers won rights unprecedented in postwar Eastern Europe.

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The apathetic mood could change if Jaruzelski does not have more success reviving the economy. The prospects are not good even if Jaruzelski has more success than his predecessors in getting the party apparatus to work in a more unified fashion than it has in the past. The prognosis for the rest of the decade is for stagnating growth, increasing hard currency debt, and further cuts in real income for the hard-pressed Polish consumer.

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Poland: Jaruzelski and the Party on the Eve of Its 10th Congress

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Introduction

The 10th Congress of the Polish United Workers' Party (PZPR), opening on 29 June, will be the first congress convened by party First Secretary and Chairman of the Council of State Gen. Wojciech Jaruzelski. As compared with the Ninth Extraordinary Congress in July 1981, this will probably be a tamer, though no less important, affair. In 1981, the PZPR was reeling from revelations of accumulated economic problems, exposes of party mismanagement and corruption, disputes over its policy toward Solidarity, and demands for democratic reforms within the party. Party leaders often took half measures meant to please everyone, and, as the PZPR's weakness became more and more apparent, its credibility as the country's leading political force plummeted. Resignations from the PZPR increased, and the party apparatus that traditionally enjoyed broad powers down to the local level gradually began to lose control. Solidarity leaders, for example, replaced party first secretaries as key figures in many Polish factories and mines.

The imposition of martial law in December 1981, two months after Jaruzelski took over as First Secretary, did little to stem the party's decline. The exodus of the rank-and-file membership accelerated as liberal members who felt betrayed by the resort to force turned in their party cards. Moreover, the party apparatus felt aggrieved as Jaruzelski largely ignored it and instead used the martial law structure and then a special network of military and civilian followers to rule the country. When membership levels finally stabilized in late 1984, the party had declined from its 1980 level of just over 3 million members to about 2.1 million.

The party is somewhat better off today. Membership is up slightly; organized groups of ideological heretics have largely been silenced; and the apparatus, having shown Jaruzelski that it is indispensable to running the country, has regained some of its power. But the party still has major problems: many party members seem dispirited and overwhelmed by Poland's deep economic and political problems; basic party organizations display little activity; and many party bureaucrats are still wary of Jaruzelski and believe they have not retrieved all the power and status they deserve.

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The congress is an important landmark for Jaruzelski and the party. It provides a stage to demonstrate that the party has been revived and an opportunity to fashion an apparatus that is more responsive to his wishes.

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Jaruzelski's Relationship With the Party

Jaruzelski's relationship with the party and particularly with the apparatus, the middle-level party professionals, has been uneasy from the beginning in October 1981. He was viewed as an outsider even though he had been a party member since 1948 and a Politburo member for 15 years. Jaruzelski impressed

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as a loyal Communist, but one who was

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disdainful of politics and more comfortable in his role as a soldier. His preoccupation with establishing civil order and his inclination to avoid the give-and-take of party politics during his first year probably reinforced this image.

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Bypassing the Party

Jaruzelski's detachment prevented him from establishing the intricate network of contacts within the apparatus that are essential to running the PZPR. He tended to rely heavily on his military colleagues and on military institutions to exert his leadership in both the party and state apparatuses. After being appointed Premier in February 1981, for example, Jaruzelski appointed three military men to head key ministries. As head of the party, Jaruzelski put a general in

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Jaruzelski the Politician

General Jaruzelski has taken to appearing in civilian clothes since becoming Chairman of the Council of State last November.

In 1981 General Jaruzelski, a soldier accustomed to a highly disciplined environment, found himself at the head of the most unruly factionalized Communist party in Eastern Europe. Since that time his principal task—which he is still far from achieving—has been to create a political and economic structure that will end the cycles of worker discontent, popular outbursts, and government repression that have plagued postwar Poland. Jaruzelski gives every indication of wanting to accomplish this goal within the framework of Poland's current political system in which the Communist party plays the dominant role. He has adopted this approach because he himself is a loyal Communist and because he knows Moscow would not allow any other political alternative.

His more immediate task, therefore, is to refashion the unpopular, corrupt, inefficient Polish Communist Party. Jaruzelski hopes to turn the PZPR into a disciplined, well-run organization in which each member loyally and energetically carries out his duties, helps build an economically viable state, and thus gradually earns for the party the respect of the people. But Jaruzelski the politician, unlike Jaruzelski the General, has found that the party resists his orders and forces him to make concessions.

It is the constant need to compromise with party factions, the church, the Soviets, and so on, which makes it difficult to determine what Jaruzelski would favor if he were not being pulled in different directions by contending forces. He has granted three amnesties to political prisoners, for example, but new arrests keep the number of detainees at about the same level. He also allows other damaging human rights practices—a tough penal code, university purges—knowing that they will wreck his ambition to establish better relations with the West.

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Occasionally, he takes a strong stand regardless of whom he might offend. He took the unprecedented step of bringing four secret policemen to trial for the murder of pro-Solidarity priest Father Popieluszko in 1984. But he continues to be very tough on the Solidarity opposition. In our judgment, Jaruzelski regards such opposition activity as a threat to the domestic calm he considers crucial for winning Soviet confidence and for beginning political and economic reconstruction.

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Another apparent contradiction in Jaruzelski's leadership style is the potential for conflict between Polish national interests or identity and Warsaw's relationship with the Soviet Union. Jaruzelski can justify his actions as being in accord with a long line of Polish statesmen whose antecedents go back to the 18th and 19th centuries when the Polish state was partitioned by Russia, Prussia, and Austria. These pragmatic politicians believed that the survival of the Polish nation and its cultural heritage depended on the Polish people's reaching an accommodation with the country's eastern Slavic neighbor. Hoping to trade political quiescence for cultural and economic freedom within the Russian Empire, they opposed those who advocated a national insurrection to regain Polish independence. These adherents of Poland's insurrectionary tradition prevailed after World War I, but lost with the establishment of a Soviet-backed regime after World War II.

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Jaruzelski's frequent public exhortations to the people to abandon "romantic notions" of Poland's existence outside the Warsaw Pact and without its close ties to the USSR are often balanced with the assertion that Poland has enjoyed unprecedented peace and stability since it came under the Soviet wing. In short, like the pragmatists of the last century, Jaruzelski insists that peace and the chance it provides for prosperity are worth the costs of living in the Soviet shadow.

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charge of the sensitive PZPR Cadre Department, a post normally held by a party professional because it controls all intraparty personnel appointments and the 250,000 positions in the economy and government reserved for party members. He also alienated the party apparatchiks by sending military inspection teams into the countryside, partly to assess the effectiveness of local party management.

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The gratitude Jaruzelski earned in the party during the martial law period for saving the political system soon dissipated.

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Meanwhile, Jaruzelski used martial law powers and the martial law structure to rule the country. Military men took over 14 provincial governorships and a variety of undersecretary jobs in government ministries. A senior military man told the national daily, *Rzeczpospolita,* in late 1982 that, in the first months of martial law, as many as 7,000 military commissars were involved in "putting the affairs of the country in order." According to the US Embassy, military men largely bypassed the professional party apparatus as they took over many of its supervisory and decision-making functions.

We believe Jaruzelski's neglect of the party machinery in the early days of martial law showed his preoccupation with preventing strikes and demonstrations that caused him to depend heavily on the military and police hierarchies. His continued disregard even after successfully asserting control of the streets reflects, we believe, a deep distrust of the powerful party bureaucrats. Jaruzelski's public remarks indicate that he regarded the party apparatus as an unreliable instrument for running the country

In the months after martial law was imposed, Jaruzelski was preoccupied with maintaining order.

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and considered its inefficiency and indifference toward the populace a major cause of the political and economic crisis that gave rise to Solidarity. A former US Ambassador in Warsaw says that Jaruzelski was surprised at the extent of corruption and mismanagement he found in the party.

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Revitalizing the Bureaucracy

After six to eight months of martial law, Jaruzelski began to pay more attention to the party and government bureaucracies.

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Jaruzelski probably was beginning to realize that he could not rule without it, even though he did not trust the party.

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During 1982, highly publicized military inspections examined the workings of 10 of 49 provinces, placing several provincial party organizations under particularly close scrutiny. In Nowy Sacz province in the

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south, for example, the military publicly exposed serious shortcomings in party operations. Jaruzelski openly urged party bureaucrats to be more responsive to the populace.

Jaruzelski also attempted to broaden the influence of nonparty institutions and to involve them in some of the governing tasks previously monopolized by the party. He may have been motivated by his perception that the party—as it was then composed—was incapable of fulfilling all of its responsibilities efficiently. But he also seemed to have a different role in mind for the party. His public statements supported the concept that the party should "rule"—set the main directions of policy—while allowing the government to govern and implement policies.

To assist both the party and the government, Jaruzelski founded a new mass organization, the Patriotic Movement of National Rebirth (PRON), and gave it limited inspection and legislative functions. In late 1982, middle-level party officials told US Embassy officers that they expected the PRON to begin submitting legislative proposals to parliament. Jaruzelski also held out the prospect of making the parliament more representative of popular wishes by providing as many as 30 newly created seats for truly independent Catholic deputies and having the PZPR and its affiliated parties relinquish some seats, Finally, Jaruzelski provided local self-governing bodies, the municipal people's councils, with the legal framework to play a greater role in formulating and implementing local policies.

None of these efforts contributed much to governmental efficiency or party morale. Government bureaucrats, who resumed work after Jaruzelski's military men had accomplished only mixed results in their efforts to shape up the government, have proved as inadequate as party apparatchiks. This conclusion is supported by the public complaints of top leaders and a confidential Council of Ministers document on personnel matters. When leaked last March, the document revealed high-level concern over the incompetence of government bureaucrats and their inability to implement policies. The consequence of this continuing trend, according to the document, was popular hostility toward the state, continued low production rates from workers, and a perpetuation of Poland's political and economic crisis. 25X1

Meanwhile, the PRON, parliament, and the people's councils have failed to gain broad participation and a more influential role. Entrenched party bureaucrats, penetrated the PRON and the people's councils and assumed a commanding role in them, thereby eroding their claims of independence and making them suspect in the eyes of the people. Soon after the PRON called for an amnesty of political prisoners in 1984, a gesture we believe was intended merely to bolster the image of the front organization, the regime started rearresting activists. As a result, a respected non-Communist founding member told a Warsaw daily last fall that the PRON, instead of helping to reform the country's political and economic system, had become a part of the system. 25X1 25X1

Jaruzelski also failed to give parliament a more independent cast. Prominent church and opposition figures rejected the government's offer to fill the parliamentary seats that were reserved for independents in the October 1985 election. These potential candidates probably doubted they could influence policy in a body in which the Communists and their affiliated parties hold 83 percent of the seats. At the same time, the powers given to the people's councils, according to the press, were limited to deciding minor issues—such as the placement of bus stops and the upkeep of rural roads—that failed to meet popular expectations raised during the Solidarity period. 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1

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Jaruzelski has had even less success in revitalizing the PZPR at the rank-and-file level. After martial law, membership losses of close to 20,000 a month throughout 1982 apparently did not alarm top leaders. In November of that year, a Central Committee senior staffer told US Embassy officers that the party would no longer be the mass organization of the 1970s, but rather a smaller party made up of dedicated activists.

This apathy about low membership apparently changed by February 1984 when Jaruzelski convened a Central Committee plenum to discuss the subject.

Jaruzelski ordered each basic and branch party organization to nominate at least one candidate for party membership. By July 1985, according to the weekly *Polityka,* only one-fifth of the basic party organizations had succeeded in fulfilling the injunction.

In sum, the record shows that Jaruzelski in his first five years as party leader has not established a good working relationship between the central party organs and the party's middle-level management. Nor has he created a bond between himself and the membership as a whole. The attention he devoted to party personnel policy at a Central Committee plenum in March 1986 suggests that he is determined to make progress in both areas. And the support he enjoys in the top leadership bodies improves his chances for eventually succeeding.

Table 1
Changes in the PZPR Politburo Since July 1981

Appointed at Ninth Congress in July 1981 or before	
Kazimierz Barcikowski	September 1980
Stefan Olszowski	August 1980
Tadeusz Czechowicz	July 1981
Gen. of Brigade Miroslaw Milewski	July 1981
Jozef Czyrek	July 1981
Jan Labecki	July 1981
Zofia Grzyb	July 1981
Army Gen. Wojciech Jaruzelski	December 1971
Hieronim Kubiak	July 1981
Zbigniew Messner	July 1981
Stanislaw Opalko	July 1981
Tadeusz Porebski	July 1981
Jerzy Romanik	July 1981
Albin Siwak	July 1981
Jan Glowczyk [a]	July 1981
Wlodzimierz Mokrzyszczak [a]	July 1981
Appointed by Jaruzelski after he became First Secretary in October 1981	
Stanislaw Kalkus	July 1982
Marian Wozniak	July 1982
Stanislaw Bejger [a]	July 1982
Gen. of Arms Czeslaw Kiszczak [a]	February 1982
Marian Orzechowski [a]	November 1983
Army Gen. Florian Siwicki [a]	October 1981
Removed by Jaruzelski	
Jan Labecki	July 1982
Miroslaw Milewski	May 1985
Stefan Olszowski	November 1985

[a] Denotes candidate member.

Opposition and Support Within the Party

The Polish party leadership traditionally has been less unified than its East European counterparts.

Jaruzelski has a comfortable majority of supporters in the most important party organs, the Politburo and the Secretariat. Opposition to Jaruzelski within the party apparatus increases, however, further down the organizational scale and is greater in the regional party organizations than in the central apparatus in Warsaw.

The Politburo

The current Politburo, we believe, is devoid of serious political rivals to Jaruzelski and is for the most part composed of moderates. We estimate that 10 of the 13 full members and five of the six candidate members are Jaruzelski supporters. Only the Krakow professor, Hieronim Kubiak, is widely regarded as a liberal; Albin Siwak, a Warsaw construction foreman, is the only outspoken hardliner on the Politburo, but he is a

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political lightweight and no threat to Jaruzelski. The rest avoid appearing as proponents of extreme views. Candidate member (and Foreign Minister) Marian Orzechowski, for example, is a Soviet-trained ideologue and reputed hardliner but backs Jaruzelski

This group is not without ambition, however, and its support for Jaruzelski could evaporate quickly.

Since becoming party leader in October 1981, Jaruzelski has named only two full members and four candidate members to the Politburo. His changes have been largely directed at removing ideologues of the extreme left or right and bringing in close personal associates and politically unknown technocrats. In 1982 he removed a liberal and brought in a worker and a party functionary with economic expertise—both considered moderates

Two candidate members, Gen. Florian Siwicki, the Defense Minister, and Gen. Czeslaw Kiszczak, the Interior Minister—who came into the Politburo, respectively, in October 1981 and February 1982—are widely assumed to be trusted colleagues of Jaruzelski by virtue of their long military association with him. Another candidate member, Gdansk First Secretary Stanislaw Bejger, is a capable technocrat

Foreign Minister Orzechowski's reported close ties to Moscow and lack of political clout make him a good "token" hardliner. Jaruzelski's more dangerous hardline opponents—Miroslaw Milewski, the Politburo and Secretariat member who supervised the security apparatus, and Stefan Olszowski, the former Foreign Minister and perennial contender to be party leader—were removed in 1985. Milewski was edged out last May on the pretext that his responsibility for security associated him with the murder by three secret policemen of Father Popieluszko. Olszowski lasted until November when he lost his party and government posts in a major shakeup that gave Jaruzelski undisputed control of the Politburo and removed from national political life the one man labeled a potentially serious threat to him.

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The Secretariat

Jaruzelski has revamped the Secretariat more than the Politburo, and the current Secretariat, we believe, is made up of nine obedient Jaruzelski supporters. Three of them—Czyrek, Porebski, and Wozniak—are also Politburo members, giving them an advantage as possible successors to Jaruzelski.

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Two other secretaries—Glowczyk and Mokrzyszczak—are also candidate Politburo members. Several can lay legitimate claim to technocratic expertise: Glowczyk and Wozniak have backgrounds as economists, and Zbigniew Michalek is an agriculturalist. Another, Waldemar Swirgon, reportedly a Jaruzelski favorite, is sufficiently young (33) to supervise youth affairs.

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Only three Secretariat members have served since Jaruzelski became First Secretary in October 1981. Two of them were appointed at the Ninth Congress in 1981: Czyrek, the former Foreign Minister who has responsibility for foreign affairs and ideology, and Michalek, the agriculturalist. Jaruzelski assigned Wlodzimierz Mokrzyszczak the organizational portfolio in October 1981. With the exception of Olszowski and Milewski, Jaruzelski's hardline opponents, the remaining five secretaries who have been removed since October 1981 have gone on to equivalent or more responsible positions. The latest addition is a military man, former Chief of the Army's Main Political Directorate, Gen. Jozef Baryla, who

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is a staunch Jaruzelski supporter. Baryla apparently took up Milewski's old security portfolio and also became senior party watchdog over the church, according to evidence in the Polish press.

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Table 2
Changes in the PZPR Central Committee Secretariat Since July 1981

	Date	Responsibility
Appointed at Ninth Congress in July 1981 or before		
Stefan Olszowski	October 1980	Economics
Kazimierz Barcikowski	October 1980	Economics, church
Jozef Czyrek [a]	July 1981	Foreign affairs, ideology
Zbigniew Michalek [a]	July 1981	Agriculture
Hieronim Kubiak	July 1981	Culture
Gen. of Brigade Miroslaw Milewski	July 1981	Security
Marian Wozniak	July 1981	Personnel
Appointed by Jaruzelski after he became First Secretary in October 1981		
Marian Orzechowski	October 1981	Ideology
Wlodzimierz Mokrzyszczak [a]	October 1981	Organization, government
Jan Glowczyk [a]	July 1982	Press and propaganda
Manfred Gorywoda	July 1982	Economic reform
Waldemar Swirgon [a]	October 1982	Youth affairs
Henryk Bednarski [a]	November 1983	Culture, education, ideology
Tadeusz Porebski [a]	November 1983	Organization
Marian Wozniak [a]	November 1985	Economics
Gen. of Arms Jozef Baryla [a]	December 1985	Security, church
Removed by Jaruzelski		
Hieronim Kubiak	July 1982	
Stefan Olszowski	July 1982	
Marian Wozniak	July 1982	
Marian Orzechowski	November 1983	
Manfred Gorywoda	February 1984	
Gen. of Brigade Miroslaw Milewski	May 1985	
Kazimierz Barcikowski	November 1985	

[a] Current Secretariat.

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The Central Committee

Jaruzelski, in our judgment, has had considerably more trouble controlling the 285-member Central Committee. The current members are mostly moderate [redacted] and generally support Jaruzelski even though they are not personally beholden to him. Hardliners [redacted] are in a distinct minority and command little influence. But the moderates have not always been willing to follow Jaruzelski's lead. Many of them support Jaruzelski's overall political and economic

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programs but are nonetheless unhappy with the continued weak state of the party and frustrated over the slow progress in overcoming Poland's problems.

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Jaruzelski has been embarrassed in Central Committee sessions by personal attacks directed at him—a rare development in Communist Eastern Europe:

- During the floor debates at a plenum in November 1983, a private farmer blamed Jaruzelski for Poland's political and economic problems. He called on Jaruzelski to give up one of his posts, arguing he could not be an effective leader serving as both government and party chief.

- At a plenum in October 1984, a hardline first secretary of a Silesian coal mine party organization and a member of the party organization of a Silesian foundry charged that Jaruzelski had made unacceptable progress in reviving the party. Almost one-third of the speakers criticized the PZPR's weakness in authority and numbers but did not directly blame Jaruzelski.

- At the plenum in December 1984, the liberal former Gdansk party chief Jan Labecki sharply attacked Jaruzelski's leadership of the party. Jaruzelski was visibly angry and, when Labecki finished, responded that the charges were groundless.

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Such attacks apparently have not seriously threatened Jaruzelski. His most determined critics are few in number and disorganized. While cliques exist, they are deeply divided and not in a position to topple Jaruzelski. We expect some of these troublemakers to be dropped at the party congress.

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The Apparatus

Jaruzelski has also had great difficulty exercising control over the powerful central and regional party bureaucracies that are responsible for the day-to-day workings of the party. Within the 16 Secretariat-controlled Central Committee departments, 11 have experienced some change in leadership since 1981.[1] Moreover, almost half of the

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[1] The General Affairs, Organization, Socio-Vocational, and Parliamentary Affairs Departments have undergone no leadership changes since 1981. A fifth department, Youth Affairs, was created in 1983 and still has the same chief.

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departments have had at least four different directors since Jaruzelski took over as party leader. Jaruzelski has installed military officers to head three departments, including the Foreign Affairs Department and the pivotal Cadre Department, which controls not only intraparty appointments but also the placement of party members in 250,000 key political and economic positions throughout the country. Seven of the new directors, however, previously held jobs within the central apparatus and three came from the provincial apparatus. Jaruzelski probably needs their expertise in internal party affairs despite the likelihood they perpetuate old attitudes.

Jaruzelski's continuing dissatisfaction with the departments may explain his attempt to expand the role of another part of the apparatus, the Central Committee's commissions. Under Jaruzelski, the traditionally moribund commissions—composed of Central Committee members, party activists, and party intellectuals—have been charged with evaluating programs proposed by the departments and then making recommendations to the Politburo. In an apparent effort to show that he takes the work of the commissions seriously and probably to ensure his control, Jaruzelski has appointed key associates to head such major commissions as Law and Order, Internal Affairs, and Ideology.

Regional Opposition

Jaruzelski has had particular difficulty in gaining control of the 49 provincial party organizations. the most significant opposition to Jaruzelski and his policies exists in the provincial and district party organizations. Aside from their anger over his treatment of the party apparatus under martial law, the local party hardliners criticize Jaruzelski for what they consider overly lenient handling of the church and Solidarity and for failing to revive the economy Polish press coverage of nationwide party meetings in early 1985 indicated considerable criticism of the state of the party, complaints that could implicitly have been directed at Jaruzelski. 25X1

Since October 1981 he has changed 26, or about 54 percent, of the provincial leaders. Two of the three changes before martial law were clearly politically motivated—the exile to a consular post in Slovakia of the chief of the hardline group in Katowice, Andrzej Zabinski, and the similar diplomatic banishment of Gdansk party boss Tadeusz Fiszbach for being too accommodating to Solidarity. The third change was to bring Mokrzyszczak to the Secretariat. Nine of the post-martial-law changes were to promote provincial chiefs to positions of greater responsibility and three were to remove political troublemakers of the right and the left like the liberal Poznan party secretary Edward Skrzypczak and the archconservative Warsaw secretary Stanislaw Kociolek. Nine of the provincial party leaders who were removed have dropped from sight, while the remaining two have made only what appear to be lateral career changes. 25X1 25X1

Looking to the Congress

The coming party congress provides Jaruzelski with his best opportunity to date to increase his control over the party. He appears determined, in our judgment, to use the congress as part of a campaign to change his image from that of a short-term military leader called upon to direct and manage the force needed to crush Solidarity to a more traditional political leader with considerable staying power. We believe he wants to lead Poland through its political and economic reconstruction and not be seen solely as the man who imposed martial law. Last autumn he brought his political profile more into line with conventions in the other Warsaw Pact countries by relinquishing the top government job while retaining the post of party First Secretary and assuming the ceremonial post of head of state. His simultaneous announcement that he would devote full attention to the party seemed intended not only to undercut criticism of the party's slow revival but also to signal his determination to keep the reins of power. 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1

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Ideology in the Service of the Party

[redacted] 25X1

1983 only after considerable delay and was the first such discussion in 20 years. The lack of Polish interest in Marxism-Leninism may be traced to its close connection with a traditional enemy, Russia, and the unpopular positions that some Polish Communists took on the nationality question and other sensitive issues. Early Polish Communists, such as Rosa Luxemburg and Feliks Dzierzynski, favored the continued incorporation of partitioned Poland in the Russian Empire, while their compatriots in 1920 supported the Red Army's invasion of Poland. The liquidation of the Polish party by Stalin in 1938 probably confirmed the view of many Poles that it was little more than a Soviet tool. After World War II, much of the populace viewed the party as an alien body imposed upon them by the Soviets, an attitude illustrated by the popular hostility engendered by Communist efforts in the postwar years to clamp down on the church and eliminate private agriculture. Significantly, Wladyslaw Gomulka was the only Polish Communist leader to enjoy genuine, if brief, popular backing when he overcame Soviet objections in 1956 and forged a unique "Polish road to socialism" that modified Moscow's political and economic model. [redacted] 25X1

The PZPR has traditionally had great difficulty addressing ideological questions. A Central Committee plenum devoted to ideology was held in October

Broadening His Appeal

Jaruzelski has taken a number of actions designed to undercut criticism and broaden his support within different wings of the party. His tougher posture toward the regime's opponents, for example, is favored by hardline critics who consider him too soft on dissidence [redacted] Jaruzelski can point to the continuing pressure he has applied on the church, the increased harassment and prosecution of opposition activists—including Lech Walesa—legislation strengthening the hand of the police, and the purge of university leaders following the revision of the liberal 1982 law on higher education. [redacted] 25X1

[redacted] Concern about maintaining a firm posture was also probably the reason for upholding the convictions of three key Solidarity figures in February, even though it cost Jaruzelski a trip to Rome and the Vatican that would have given him much needed international credibility. [redacted] 25X1 25X1

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The Party Program

Jaruzelski's efforts to appeal to all wings of the party is strikingly evident in the draft party program that sets out the PZPR's goals for the rest of the century. The draft program, the first in the party's history, has been the subject of sometimes heated debate since it was completed in February 1985 by a 97-member drafting committee that reportedly was chaired at one time by Jaruzelski himself. Published in February 1986 and sent out for three months of local discussion, the program allows for the development of a uniquely Polish brand of socialism while reaffirming the universal applicability of the Soviet model. The draft, in our estimation, shows the disunity within the Polish party and does nothing to resolve the debate between those who believe Polish Communists should rigidly adhere to the Soviet model and those who argue the need to tolerate unique Polish political and economic conditions such as a large private agricultural sector and a strong, independent Roman Catholic Church.

Indeed, the program gives both sides ideological ammunition. It calls for limiting the party to setting main policy directions while allowing the government considerable leeway to govern. This is to be accomplished by gradually improving the government cadres and giving local self-government bodies responsibility for administrative tasks, precisely the strategy espoused by Jaruzelski early in his tenure. But the program also reaffirms the need for the PZPR to play the "leading role in society"—traditionally the party bureaucracy's justification for monopolizing political and economic decision making. Party members are also charged with playing an increased role in the supposedly independent local self-governing bodies. The program emphasizes the need for greater democracy in political life—by encouraging greater worker participation in political and economic decision making—but undercuts this by reaffirming the party as the "guardian" of working-class interests.

The program makes a conciliatory gesture to Poland's overwhelming Catholic majority by inviting them and other nonparty people to participate more in government bodies, but then shows the limits of the tolerance by condemning virtually every non-Marxist viewpoint as anachronistic. Unlike previous guidelines, the draft program appears to place new restrictions on party membership by requiring applicants to have a "scientific" (read atheistic) world outlook. 25X1

The draft's economic section attempts to satisfy reformers by supporting decentralization, while giving traditionalists the ritual statement that central planning remains a key element of economic policy. It also stresses the need to strengthen the state sector, and relegates the private sector to producing "some commodities" and providing small trade outlets and "additional services." The draft promises an increase in the average size of private farms, but says that the state sector will also grow and characterizes as "inevitable" the gradual transfer of land from private hands to the socialized sector. Finally, each reference to the need to expand economic ties to the West is balanced with the assertion that Poland's economic relations with CEMA and particularly the USSR are paramount. 25X1 25X1

Revising the Rules

Jaruzelski has laid the groundwork for a revision of the party rules and procedures that he wants the congress to ratify. According to the press, the committee charged with revising the PZPR statute recommended that the two-term limit on leadership posts be retained, and only the procedure for standing for a third successive term be modified. Jaruzelski needs such a rule change in order to avoid lameduck status for the next five years. Similarly, the changes will have to encompass party officials elected at the lower level if Jaruzelski appointees are to stay in place longer than the prescribed two and a half years. He probably would like to eliminate the multiple candidacy and secret ballot provisions in party elections in order to facilitate the appointment of his own candidates in provincial and city elections. 25X1

Jaruzelski also appears to be trying to circumvent party statutes that call for delegates to the congress to be elected by secret ballot from among multiple candidates. As part of the precongress preparations, personal interviews have been conducted with each of the 2.1 million PZPR members. Despite repeated 25X1

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public assurances that this would not be a purge, we believe the interviews have led to the removal of some party members. More important, the interviews presumably have enabled the leadership to single out suitable prospective delegates.

we believe the leadership has manipulated the elections of congress delegates. As of late April, more than 100 of 1,600 delegates had been chosen by local party organizations, but only three faced any competition. Jaruzelski's critics, however, may also be having some success in rigging the choice of delegates. Polish press coverage of the elections has focused on criticism of the state of the party and the economy—issues on which Jaruzelski has been criticized.

Continued Resistance

Jaruzelski's critics have not been cowed, in fact, and have been willing to speak out on certain issues. Edward Ochab, for example, a hardline party first secretary from the 1940s, published a letter late last year in a PZPR historical monthly defending his role in the ouster of Wladyslaw Gomulka in 1948 and condemning current support for Gomulka's concept of the "Polish road to socialism." Jaruzelski has endorsed this concept

The Polish press in March and April of this year appealed for a positive reevaluation of the life and times of Boleslaw Bierut, the postwar Stalinist leader whose name has been anathema since 1956. His name was not included along with Gomulka's in the list of Communist heroes found in the draft PZPR program.

Jaruzelski has also clearly lost a few battles. Hardliners in the Polish Writers' Union earlier this year ousted Jaruzelski's handpicked president of the union from her posts in the Warsaw chapter. They also blocked the selection as delegates to the national writers' congress current national union leaders from the Warsaw chapter, including the biggest names in the pantheon of Polish Communist authors. Jaruzelski, according to the US Embassy, was outraged by his opponents' success. 25X1 25X1

Continued resistance probably reflects, in our judgment, a calculation by hardliners that Jaruzelski is vulnerable in some areas. But it also is indicative of the difficulties of enforcing conformity and overcoming a tradition of political maneuvering within the Polish party, even by people who have been removed from high positions. 25X1 25X1

Informal ideological factions of both the left and especially the right continue to exist despite the 1982 decree prohibiting them and Jaruzelski's efforts to break them up. 25X1 25X1

Stanislaw Bejger, candidate Politburo member and first secretary of the Gdansk provincial party organization, told the weekly *Polityka* last July that these factions, which were so troublesome at the 1981 party congress, will also "cause trouble" at the next. 25X1 25X1

Soviet Approval

Jaruzelski's ace in the hole in his bid for gaining greater control is the warm Soviet support he currently enjoys. His preferential treatment at the 27th CPSU Congress in February was a significant indication of Moscow's political backing. Jaruzelski spoke a full day before the other East European leaders and 25X1

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General Secretary Gorbachev and Jaruzelski at the Warsaw Pact summit in the Polish capital, April 1985.

sat near General Secretary Gorbachev on the dais. The generally positive Soviet press treatment of his speech to the congress included his references to the importance of national peculiarities in building socialism.

Jaruzelski was also permitted a highly publicized visit to the former Polish city of Vilnius in Lithuania, where he met with ethnic Poles and visited Polish cultural monuments, an experience that was certain to add to his political stature at home. Soviet approval of the trip, in our estimation, was unprecedented, given Moscow's sensitivity on nationality issues in the Baltic and elsewhere.

The Soviets' support for Jaruzelski derives from his success in maintaining stability, the uncertain potential of all other candidates for his job, and his willingness, especially over the last year, to heed some of their concerns.

25X1

We assume the Soviets were particularly satisfied by the failure of Solidarity's call for meat price hike protests last July, the limited response to its boycott of the October parliamentary election, and the regime's ability to prevent any significant May Day demonstrations this year. In addition, 25X1

Moscow is apparently pleased with Warsaw's "hardline" policy toward the United States, particularly the Poles' refusal to make any political concessions in the interest of ending economic sanctions and improving relations. 25X1 25X1

25X1

25X1

because Moscow regards the Polish domestic security situation as reasonably stable, it now expects more progress in the political arena and the economy. The Soviet press reports Moscow's continued interest in seeing the PZPR play a role that is more in keeping with Soviet practice, and we suspect Moscow is concerned about the continued inactivity in basic party organizations. 25X1 25X1 25X1

The recently concluded five-year trade agreement, which provides that the Poles balance their trade with the Soviets by 1988, suggests that 25X1

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Moscow will be pressing hard for more timely deliveries of coal, cement, rolled steel, machines, and equipment.

Outlook

We believe Jaruzelski will emerge from the congress in the strongest position since he became party leader in October 1981. The congress will also provide a forum for some criticism of Jaruzelski and his policies, despite his control over the planning and organization of the event. Although embarrassing, we doubt such criticism will pose a serious political challenge. He has managed in his four plus years to get enough of his own supporters into key positions, and the elections at the congress are likely to improve on that record and strengthen his control.

The reformist atmosphere and political turmoil that surrounded the Ninth Congress in 1981 and enabled the delegates to alter the rules and elect the Central Committee and First Secretary at the beginning of the congress has dissipated. Jaruzelski has succeeded in placing the election of the Central Committee and the other top leadership posts at the very end of the agenda, after the ratification of the proposed rules changes. This will enable Jaruzelski and his supporters to devote virtually the entire proceedings to creating a consensus among the delegates and isolating any troublemakers. Success in changing the party rules, especially abolishing the secret ballot, will give Jaruzelski an even greater advantage in getting the Central Committee he wants. At the same time, however, the pool of delegates from which the party's ruling body will be chosen may include many more outspoken party activists than Jaruzelski would like. Having also emphasized a tougher attitude in the runup to the congress, Jaruzelski may find that the delegates expect such attitudes to be well represented on the new Central Committee.

Changes in the Politburo are likely to be carefully balanced to represent a range of views in order to provide some reassurance to differing wings of the party and because Jaruzelski likes to hear contrasting viewpoints. Jaruzelski probably will keep some of his military colleagues close at hand, although Soviet concerns about too much prominence for the military may restrict the number of generals promoted. Military men with the best chance of gaining full Politburo membership are General Kiszczak, the Interior Minister; General Siwicki, the Defense Minister; and General Baryla, the security boss. A rising star such as the apparently moderate Warsaw party chief Janusz Kubasiewicz, who accompanied Jaruzelski to the Moscow congress, may also be favored with Politburo status. 25X1

Jaruzelski is less likely, in our view, to feel the need to overhaul the Secretariat. Key portfolios covering the economy and security were only recently assigned to his loyalists, Wozniak and Baryla, and there are no obvious opponents for Jaruzelski to eliminate. Any changes may be aimed at bringing in some new blood and permitting longtime incumbents such as Michalek and Mokrzyszczak to move on to new duties. 25X1

A smoothly run congress that demonstrates Jaruzelski's control over the central leadership bodies will facilitate his efforts to gain a tighter hold over the other parts of the apparatus. He will have the opportunity to make more changes at the regional and local levels during party election campaigns scheduled for the autumn and winter of 1986. Installing leaders he wants in the provinces and cities, in particular, will better enable him to institute personnel procedures—such as cadre rotations and assigning basic party organizations more oversight over local officials—that are essential to creating a bureaucracy responsive to his will and efficient at managing problems. 25X1

We believe Jaruzelski will emerge from the postcongress local elections with a stronger hand but still without the kind of control he seeks. Moreover, it will take considerably more time, in our judgment, for him to build a more responsive, disciplined party bureaucracy, if it can be done at all. Polish party bureaucrats have a consistent record of resisting the efforts of previous party leaders to bring them into line. In any event, he will continue to be forced to devote considerable attention to manipulating the party and ensuring 25X1

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Poland: Growth of GNP, 1971-90



that it implements, or at a minimum does not obstruct, his overall policies. Keeping the bureaucrats in place, in turn, is likely to ensure a perpetuation of many of the practices that contributed to the crisis of 1980 and make a reconciliation with the hostile or indifferent populace difficult.

The outlook for long-term economic improvement is equally bleak and is sure to mean a continuation of the stalemate between the regime and the populace that characterized the first half decade of Jaruzelski's leadership. The regime has failed to implement the structural changes necessary to solve its economic problems or to secure new credits from Western governments that would finance badly needed industrial modernization and improve Warsaw's ability to manage its debt. At the same time, consumers are on notice to expect continued price increases and limits on the growth of wages and benefits. The resulting cuts in real income, and the unlikelihood of significant improvement in supplies of basic consumer goods, will increasingly anger workers and raise the chances for popular outbursts and government repression.

25X1

Implications for the United States

We believe Jaruzelski's continued preoccupation with internal party politicking, especially in the immediate postcongress period, makes it unlikely that he will pursue tactics consistent with US expectations on human rights or make significant conciliatory gestures to the populace. Jaruzelski will most likely continue to try to cater to the different wings of the party with seemingly contradictory moderate and tough political gestures. For example, General Baryla told the press in April that new law-and-order legislation is in the offing and that the existing law on "parasitism," partly aimed at the harassment of former Solidarity activists, is to be made more stringent. The regime may well make good on its talk of a fourth amnesty of political prisoners after the congress as a gesture to the moderates, but the authorities have already implied that senior Solidarity figures now in custody will not be included. Similarly, the ranks of political prisoners could quickly swell again if Solidarity attempts to mount a protest campaign against meat price increases already announced for August.

25X1

25X1

Jaruzelski will continue to seek improved relations with the West as part of his quest for normalization and because of Poland's need for financial assistance. We believe he wants better ties to the United States but will be unwilling to be the first to make concessions to achieve any improvement. On the contrary, he will assert that he has already gone far enough to meet Washington's expectations on Poland's domestic situation. In urging greater financial generosity by the West, he will argue that regular meetings with Cardinal Glemp and the certainty of a third Papal visit in 1987 are evidence of a dialogue with the church, that

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ongoing consultations with the government-sponsored trade unions make them fit replacements for Solidarity, and that regular amnesties have given Poland a good record on human rights and political prisoners. In sum, the United States over the next year is likely to confront a Polish leader who is struggling to broaden his internal control, and who needs Western assistance to help create conditions that would facilitate that objective, but who is unlikely to move much beyond current policies in an effort to obtain that assistance.

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